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FORCING AS A COMPUTATIONAL PROCESS
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS, RUSSELL MILLER, AND KAMERYN J. WILLIAMS
Abstract. We investigate how set-theoretic forcing can be seen as a compu-
tational process on the models of set theory. Given an oracle for information
about a model of set theory 〈M,∈M 〉, we explain senses in which one may
compute M -generic filters G ⊆ P ∈ M and the corresponding forcing exten-
sions M [G]. Specifically, from the atomic diagram one may compute G, from
the ∆0-diagram one may compute M [G] and its ∆0-diagram, and from the ele-
mentary diagram one may compute the elementary diagram of M [G]. We also
examine the information necessary to make the process functorial, and con-
clude that in the general case, no such computational process will be functorial.
For any such process, it will always be possible to have different isomorphic
presentations of a model of set theory M that lead to different non-isomorphic
forcing extensions M [G]. Indeed, there is no Borel function providing generic
filters that is functorial in this sense.
1. Introduction
The method of forcing, introduced by Paul Cohen to show the consistency of the
failure of the continuum hypothesis, has become ubiquitous within set theory.1 In
this paper we analyze this method from the perspective of computable structure
theory. To what extent is forcing an effective process?
Main Question. Given an oracle for a countable model of set theory M , to what
extent can we compute its various forcing extensions M [G]?
The answer is affirmative in several senses.
Main Theorem 1 (Forcing as a computational process).
(1) For each countable model M of set theory and for any forcing notion P ∈M
there is an M -generic filter G ⊆ P computable from the atomic diagram of
M .
(2) Given the ∆0-diagram
2 of M and a forcing notion P ∈ M , we can uni-
formly compute such G, the atomic diagram of M [G], and moreover the
∆0-diagram of M [G].
(3) From P and the elementary diagram of M , we can uniformly compute
the elementary diagram of M [G], and this holds level-by-level for the Σn-
diagrams.
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1We will give an overview of the construction during Section 4. For full details we refer the
reader to [Sho71] or [Kun80]. See also [Cho09] for a conceptual overview.
2∆0 in the sense of the Le´vy hierarchy, as described below.
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These statements are proved in Section 4 as Theorems 8, 10, and 11 below. In
Section 5 we will extend these results to look at the generic multiverse of a countable
model of set theory, i.e. those models obtained from the original model by taking
both forcing extensions and grounds, where taking grounds is the process inverse to
building forcing extensions. In Section 6 we also consider versions of these results
for class forcing instead of set forcing.
We remark here that in this context the ∆0-diagram of M refers to the set
of formulae true in M that are ∆0 in the Le´vy hierarchy. In this hierarchy, the
standard one used within set theory, ∆0-formulae are those whose only quantifiers
are bounded by sets, that is, of the form ∃x ∈ y or ∀x ∈ y. This differs from ∆0
in the arithmetical hierarchy, whose formulae’s quantifiers are only those bounded
by the order relation on ω, that is of the form ∃x < y or ∀x < y. In Section 2 we
will show that very little can be computed from the atomic diagram for a model of
set theory. From the diagram we are not even able to compute relations as simple
as x ⊆ y. We view this as evidence that for the computable structure theory of
set theory the Le´vy ∆0-diagram is an appropriate choice of the basic information
to be used. The usual signature of set theory—just equality and the membership
relation—is too spartan to say anything of use. In Section 3 we introduce an
expansion of the signature for set theory which captures the strength of the Le´vy
∆0-diagram. We show that the Σn-formulae in the Le´vy hierarchy are precisely
those that are Σn in the arithmetical hierarchy with the expanded signature.
We end the paper, in Sections 7 and 8, by investigating how much information
is required to make the process of computing M [G] from M functorial. Without
significant detail about the dense subsets of P, it will not be so. Recall that a pre-
sentation of a countable structure M is simply a structure isomorphic to M whose
domain is ω. The following theorem emphasizes the importance of not conflating
the isomorphism type of M with a specific presentation of M .
Main Theorem 2 (Nonfunctoriality of forcing). There is no computable procedure
and indeed no Borel procedure which performs the tasks of Main Theorem 1 in a
uniform way so that distinct presentations of the model M will result in isomorphic
presentations of the extension M [G].
We also show that forcing can be made a functorial process. One way to do
this is to add extra information to the signature of the model. Another way is to
restrict to a special class of models, namely the pointwise definable models.
2. The atomic diagram of a model of set theory knows very little
In this section, we show that very little about a model of set theory can be
computed from its atomic diagram. In particular, many basic set-theoretic relations
are not decidable from the atomic diagram. As a warmup, let us first see that the
atomic diagram does not suffice to identify even a single fixed element.
Proposition 3. For any countable model of set theory 〈M,∈M 〉 and any element
b ∈ M , no algorithm will pick out the number representing b uniformly given an
oracle for the atomic diagram of a copy of M .
For example, given the atomic diagram of a copy of M , one cannot reliably find
the empty set, nor the ordinal ω, nor the set R of reals.
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Proof. Fix b ∈M and fix an oracle for the atomic diagram of a copy ofM . Suppose
we are faced with an algorithm purported to identify b. Run the algorithm until it
has produced a number that it claims is representing b. This algorithm inspected
only finitely much of the atomic diagram of M . The number b it produced has
at most finitely many elements in that portion of the atomic diagram. But M
has many sets that extend that pattern of membership, and so we may find an
alternative copy M ′ of M whose atomic diagram agrees with the original one on
the part that was used by the computation, but disagrees afterwards in such a way
that the number for b now represents a different set. So the algorithm will get the
wrong answer on M ′. 
This idea can be extended to characterize which relations on M are computably
from the atomic diagram. In particular, any such relation must contain both finite
and infinite sets.
Theorem 4. Let 〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZF be a countable model of set theory and let X ⊆Mn
for 1 ≤ n < ω. The following are equivalent.
(1) X is uniformly relatively intrinsically computably enumerable in the atomic
diagram of M .
(2) Membership of each single ~a in X is witnessed by a finite pattern of ∈ in the
transitive closures of {a0}, . . . , {an−1}, and the list of finite patterns wit-
nessing membership is enumeration-reducible to the (non-Le´vy) Σ1-diagram
of M .
(3) There is a Lω1,ω-formula ϕ(x) so that ϕ(x) is (non-Le´vy) Σ1 and defines
X, and the set of (finite) disjuncts in this formula is enumeration-reducible
to the (non-Le´vy) Σ1-diagram of M .
Proof. (1⇔ 3) is a standard fact in computable structure theory, first established
in [AKMS89], relativized here since M does not have a computable presentation.
(2 ⇒ 1) For notational simplicity we will present the argument for the n = 1
case. Suppose membership of a in X ⊆ M is witnessed by a finite pattern of ∈ in
the transitive closure of {a}. That is, a is in X if and only if one of a certain list of
finite graphs can be found in the pointed graph (TC({a}), a,∈M ). By hypothesis
this list is e-reducible to the Σ1-diagram of M , which we can enumerate, since we
have the atomic diagram of M as an oracle. Therefore, we can list out these finite
graphs, one by one. Meanwhile, we enumerate ∈M and M , and continually check
whether the most recent pair in ∈M has completed a copy of a graph from this list.
If such happens, then we search through the a ∈ M we have already enumerated
and check whether a has one of these graphs appearing below its transitive closure.
We output all the a for which this happens. We also check whether the most recent
a ∈ M has a copy of one of the graphs in the portion of its transitive closure
so far enumerated. If that happens, we output a. This process will find every
a ∈M which has a copy of this graph below its transitive closure, so it will exactly
enumerate X .
(1 ⇒ 2) Again, we will we present the proof for the n = 1 case for notational
simplicity. Assume that X is uniformly relatively intrinsically computable enumer-
able from the atomic diagram of M . That is, the decision of whether a ∈ X must
be made by a finite portion of the graph ∈M where we are only allowed to know the
index of a itself. We can separate this information into two pieces, that inside the
transitive closure of {a} and that outside. We claim that only the first information
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can be relevant, which then implies (2). To see this, observe that every possible
finite pattern of finite graphs (with a as a constant) occurs outside of the transitive
closure of {a} in every model of set theory. So the information outside is true for
every a ∈M and thus cannot have any effect on the decision of whether to output
a in the enumeration. 
As a consequence of this theorem, the atomic diagram of a model of set theory
does not know any of the predicates and relations named in Lemma 7 below, which
are each easily checked to fail item (2) of Theorem 4. In short, the atomic diagram
of a model of set theory knows little about the model. Before addressing forcing,
therefore, we now present a natural expansion of the signature, under which the
atomic diagram will present the information that set theorists normally consider to
be basic.
3. The Le´vy diagram
The signature ordinarily used in set theory is simple: it consists of the binary
relation ∈ along with equality. This signature suffices all by itself to express all of
mathematics (possibly using assumptions beyond ZFC). But from the perspective
of computable structure theory we cannot say much using just the atomic diagram
in this signature. As we see it, the lesson here is that this atomic diagram is too
weak to take as the basic information for the computable structure theory of models
of set theory. Instead, we will work with the ∆0-diagram, in the sense of the Le´vy
hierarchy, in which set-bounded quantification is not counted when determining
quantifier complexity of a formula.
This conflicts with the convention in computability theory, where “bounded
quantification” refers to bounded in the sense of arithmetic—i.e. of the form ∃x < y
or ∀x < y—rather than bounded in the sense of a relation of the structure. In short,
∆0 in the Le´vy hierarchy is not the same as ∆0 in the arithmetical hierarchy, as
∀x ∈ a ϕ(x) may express infinitely many independent atomic statements.
In this section we describe how we can make the Le´vy hierarchy line up with the
arithmetical hierarchy, by expanding the signature to capture the content of the
(Le´vy) ∆0-diagram. Let us call this expanded signature the Le´vy signature. This
provides an alternate way to think of the ∆0-diagram. One may instead work with
the atomic diagram in this expanded signature, with the correspondence between
the two being effective. And this correspondence continues upward, with Σn in
the Le´vy hierarchy corresponding to Σn in the arithmetical hierarchy with this
expanded signature. In the sequel, we will speak of the ∆0-diagram or Σn-diagram,
referring to the Le´vy hierarchy, but the reader who prefers the other approach may
freely translate over the statements.3
Definition 5. The Le´vy signature contains the binary relation symbol ∈ and also,
for each ∆0-formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), an n-ary predicate Rϕ. Structures in the Le´vy
signature are assumed to satisfy the axiom schema (over all ∆0-formulae):
∀~x [Rϕ(~x) ⇐⇒ ϕ(~x)].
3As further evidence for the naturalness of this expansion of the language, we note that it has
arisen in other contexts. Venturi and Viale [VV19] studied model companions for set theory. For
their work they also found it helpful to expand the signature from the spartan {∈} to include
symbols for each ∆0 relation.
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For example, since inclusion is defined by a ∆0-formula using only ∈, we see that
M |= b ⊆ c ⇐⇒ M |= ∀y ∈ b y ∈ c ⇐⇒ M |= R(∀y∈x1)y∈x2(b, c).
Since we can enumerate the ∆0-formulae effectively, the language of the Le´vy signa-
ture is a computable language, and it includes equality (defined by x ⊆ y ∧ y ⊆ x).
Our choice of signature allows us to imitate the usual set-theoretic convention
under which ∆0 is the lowest possible complexity of a formula. Additionally, sets
defined by Σn-formulae in the Le´vy hierarchy will all be arithmetically Σn in models
of ZF in the Le´vy signature, by the following standard lemma.
Lemma 6. For every formula ϕ(t1, . . . , tn, x, y, z) in the Le´vy hierarchy,
ZF ⊢ ∀~t [∀x ∈ z ∃y ϕ(~t, x, y, z)⇐⇒ ∃Y ∀x ∈ z ∃y ∈ Y ϕ(~t, x, y, z)].
Proof. If M |= ∀x ∈ z ∃y ϕ(~a, x, y, z) for a model 〈M,∈M 〉 of ZF with parameters
~a, then by the Replacement axiom schema, there is some set Y in M such that
M |= ∀x ∈ z ∃y ∈ Y ϕ(~a, x, y, z). The reverse direction is trivial. 
The lemma, applied repeatedly, allows us to turn every formula from the sig-
nature with just membership and equality into an equivalent formula which is in
a prenex form, with all unbounded quantifiers preceding a ∆0 matrix, and which
has the same complexity (in the Le´vy hierarchy) as the original formula. There-
fore, every formula of Le´vy complexity Σn may be expressed in the Le´vy signature
by a formula of arithmetic complexity Σn, and there is an effective procedure for
producing the latter from the former.
To conclude this section, let us remark that many basic predicates of set theory
are ∆0, and that the basic predicates for forcing are ∆1 and hence computable from
the ∆0-diagram.
Lemma 7. For models M of ZFC, the following predicates are all ∆0.
• x = ∅.
• x ⊆ y.
• x = {y, z}.
• x =
⋃
y.
• x = {z ∈ y : ϕ(z)}, for ∆0-
formulae ϕ(z).
• x is a (Kuratowski) ordered pair.
• x is a set of ordered pairs.
• x is a function.
• x is transitive.
• x is an ordinal.
• x is inductive.
• x = ω.
We omit any proof of these standard facts. More pertinently for this article, let
us briefly remark that the relations “x is a P-name”, p  σ ∈ τ , and p  σ = τ
are all ∆1 and hence computable from the ∆0-diagram. This will be important in
Section 4 to see that the ∆0-diagram suffices to compute a forcing extension.
4. Computing forcing extensions
For the sake of the reader who may not be an expert in set theory, we interleave
our proof of the first main theorem with an exposition of forcing. This exposition
will follow the three parts of the main theorem. First we discuss generic filters and
we show that a generic filter may be effectively built from just the atomic diagram.
We next discuss how to build the forcing extensionM [G] from the ground modelM
and the generic G. Then we show that there is an effective procedure to construct
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(the atomic diagram of) the forcing extension from the ∆0-diagram of the ground
model. Finally, we discuss how truth in the forcing extension is determined by the
forcing relations in the ground model. Then we can show that elementary diagram
of the forcing extension is effectively computable from the elementary diagram of
the ground model.
In the ground universe M , a partially ordered set P gives partial information
about an object from outside the universe. A condition p is stronger than another
condition q, written p ≤ q, if it gives more information about this outside object. It
is convenient to assume that P has a maximum element 1 which gives no informa-
tion. Two conditions are compatible, written p ‖ q, if there is a condition stronger
than both of them. Otherwise, they are incompatible, written p ⊥ q. Formally, the
outside object is an M -generic filter G ⊆ P. That is, it is downward directed and
upward closed, and it meets every dense D ⊆ P in M . Here, D ⊆ P is dense if
every condition in P can be strengthened to a condition in D. It is a straightfor-
ward exercise that if P is splitting—any condition p extends to two incompatible
conditions—then M itself contains no M -generic filter.
However, if M is countable, we can always externally construct an M -generic
filter G ⊆ P, and the construction works uniformly for all P (and all ∆0(M)). We
simply fix the first-encountered p0 ∈ P as our starting point (using the external
order < on the domain ω of M to find it) and then ask of each element s ∈ ω in
turn whether the current ps can be extended to an element of P ∩ s. This is a ∆0
question, and we either find the least ps+1 ≤ ps lying in s if the ∆0(M) indicates
that one exists, or else set ps+1 = ps. Finally, set G = {q ∈ P : q ‖ pn for some n}.
Of course, if s was a dense subset of P, then we ensured that G does meet s, so this
G is M -generic.
In fact, there exists a generic filter that is computable merely from the atomic
diagram, as we now show.
Theorem 8. Given an oracle for the atomic diagram of a model of set theory
〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZF and a notion of forcing P ∈ M , there is a computable procedure to
compute an M -generic filter G ⊆ P.
Proof. Fix an oracle for 〈M,∈M 〉. That is, we are presented on the oracle tape with
an isomorphic copy of M as a binary relation on the natural numbers. Indeed, we
might as well assume that M = N and ∈M is that relation on N. Let P ∈M be any
notion of forcing in M . More specifically, we have in M an element P ∈M for the
underlying set of the partial order, and we also have a set ≤P in M for the forcing
order relation as what M thinks is the set of ordered pairs for that relation. We
assume that the Kuratowski pairing function (p, q) = { { p }, { p, q } } is used when
coding ordered pairs.
Notice that from the atomic diagram we can decide whether a given number p
represents an element of P or not, since we need only ask the oracle whether p ∈M P.
Further, we can computably enumerate the pairs (p, q) of forcing conditions with
p ≤P q. For this we must unwrap the Kuratowski pairing function, but this is
possible as follows. We search for conditions p, q in P and for elements x ∈ ≤P that
represent the pair (p, q). This will happen when x = { y, z }, where y = { p } and
z = { p, q }. So we can search for the elements y and z which have y ∈M x and
z ∈M x and p ∈M y and p, q ∈M z. When this happens, we can be confident that
p ≤P q. (This kind of computational inspection of the Kuratowski ordered pair also
arose in [GH17].)
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But actually, we can fully decide the relation ≤P, not just enumerate it. The
reason is that M , being a model of set theory, has what it thinks is the set of
pairs (p, q) ∈ P2 with p 6≤P q. And so for any pair p, q, we can search for it to
be enumerated by ≤P or by the analogous procedure applied with 6≤P, and thereby
decide whether p ≤P q or not.
Next, let D ∈ M be the set that M thinks is the set of all dense subsets of P.
From this data, we can enumerate the elements D0, D1, D2, . . . of D, listing all the
elements of M that M thinks are dense subsets of P. We simply run through all
the natural numbers d, and ask the oracle whether d ∈M D, and if so, we put it on
the list.
Let us use this enumeration to compute a descending sequence of forcing condi-
tions
p0 ≥P p1 ≥P p2 ≥P · · ·
with pn ∈ Dn. To begin, we let p0 be the first-encountered element of D0, which
exists because D0 is dense. Next, given pn, we search through the natural numbers
for the first-encountered condition pn+1 ≤P pn such that pn+1 ∈ Dn+1. There is
always such a condition because Dn+1 is dense.
Finally, having constructed the descending sequence, we define G as the set of
conditions q for which pn ≤ q for some n. This is an M -generic filter, because it
is a filter and it meets every dense subset of P in M . The elements of G can be
enumerated by the processes above, because whenever we find a condition q for
which pn ≤P q for some n, then we can enumerate q into the filter.
But actually, we claim that G is fully decidable from the oracle, not just enu-
merable. To see this, let ⊥P be the set in M that M thinks is the set of pairs (p, q)
of incompatible conditions p ⊥ q. By genericity, it follows that if q /∈ G, it must be
that q ⊥P pn for some n, since it is dense to either get below q or become incompat-
ible with it. The algorithms above allow us to enumerate the pairs of incompatible
conditions, and so for any condition q, we search for a pn for which either pn ≤P q
or pn ⊥P q, and in this way we can tell whether q ∈ G or q /∈ G, as desired. 
The algorithm above is non-uniform in several senses. First, the algorithm makes
use not only of the indices of the forcing notion (namely, the set P, the set ≤P and
the complement of ≤P in P × P), but also the index of the set of dense subsets
of P, and the index ⊥P for the set of incomparable elements. The methods of
Theorem 4 show that it is not possible in general to compute these just from the
atomic diagram of 〈M,∈M 〉 and P. Second, a more serious kind of non-uniformity
arises from the fact that, even if we are given this additional data and even if we
are given the full elementary diagram of the model M , the particular generic filter
that we end up with will depend on the order in which M is represented in this
presentation. The filter G is determined in part by the order in which the dense
sets Dn appear in the presentation of M . If one rearranges the dense sets, then
at a certain stage, one might be led to place a different, incompatible condition on
the sequence, and this will give rise to a different filter. In Sections 7 and 8, we
shall examine uniformity in more detail and prove there is no uniform computable
procedure nor even Borel function that always produces the same generic filter G
from all isomorphic presentations of the same model M .
We also want to remark that it mattered which pairing function we used. Given
sets x, y, p where we know p is a Kuratowski ordered pair it requires looking at only
finitely many objects to check whether p = (x, y). On the other hand, there are
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∆0 definitions for ordered pairs which we cannot computably unravel from just the
atomic diagram. Consider the Morse pairing function
(x, y)⋆ = ({ 0 } × x) ∪ ({ 1 } × y),
where the product here is defined via the Kuratowski ordered pair.4 This definition
is ∆0 in the Le´vy hierarchy. But to recognize whether p = (x, y)
⋆ requires looking
at infinitely many elements of the model when at least one of x and y is infinite,
making it not effective (from just the atomic diagram). It follows from Theorem 4
that the relation p = (x, y)⋆ is not decidable from the atomic diagram, even if we
know p is a Morse pair.
We next turn to the construction of the full forcing extension. Given a generic
filter G, which we have already seen how to construct, we need to determine the
rest of the sets that will be the forcing extension ofM . New sets are given by names
in M , which are then interpreted by the generic. These P-names are recursively
defined as sets whose elements are pairs (σ, p) with σ a P-name and p ∈ P. This
amounts to a recursive definition on rank, with each P-name having an ordinal
rank.
Lemma 9. The property of being a P-name is ∆1, hence decidable uniformly in
the ∆0-diagram of M .
Naively, one might attempt to prove that the class of P-names is Σ1 by, given an
element x, querying the ∆0-diagram to check that all elements of x are pairs whose
first coordinate is a P-name, which is checked by querying the ∆0-diagram, and
recursively continue this process until it halts. (And similarly to prove the class of
P-names is Π1.) The trouble with this approach is that this recursive procedure is
transfinite; even in the case it is internally finite, M might be ω-nonstandard and
thus have internally finite sets which are externally seen to be infinite. Nevertheless,
the key of this idea is correct, and it can be made into a proper proof. The point
is that instead of externally carrying out the recursive procedure, we instead look
inside M for a certificate that the recursive procedure was carried out.
Proof of Lemma 9. To see that being a P-name is Σ1, given a set x we check whether
x is a P-name by searching for a tree witnessing that x satisfies the recursive def-
inition of a P-name. Such a tree has x as its root, and the immediate children of
the root are the first coordinates of elements of x. These nodes then have their
own children by the same process, and this continues downward through the whole
tree. This tree is necessarily well-founded (in the sense of M), because M thinks
its membership relation is well-founded. And this tree witnesses that x is a P-name
if the second coordinate of each node is in P and no node has an element not repre-
sented among its children. It is clear that given a tree T it is ∆0 to check whether
it satisfies this property of witnessing that x is a P-name, since this requires only
quantifying over nodes in the tree and over P. And thus the class of P-names is Σ1.
To see that it is also Π1 we carry out a similar procedure, except now we look for
a tree witnessing that the recursive definition of being a P-name fails for x. Being
such a tree is again ∆0, because failure is witnessed by looking at and below some
node. This then gives that being a P-name is a ∆1 property. 
4This pairing function has the nice property that if x, y ⊆ Vα where α is a limit ordinal, then
(x, y)⋆ ⊆ Vα.
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We would like to remark that this argument generalizes; any property defined
by a set-theoretic recursion of ∆0 properties will be ∆1.
A standard approach to forcing is to define the interpretation of a name σ by G,
denoted σG, to be the set of τG for (τ, p) ∈ σ for some p ∈ G. But this recursive
interpretation can only be carried out if M is well-founded, limiting which models
it can be applied to. Fortunately, there is an alternative construction we can use,
which matches this construction in case M is well-founded.
Every set theorist knows that there are a pair of definable relations,
p P σ = τ
p P σ ∈ τ,
which determine membership and equality in the forcing extension. Namely, σG ∈
τG if and only if there is p ∈ G so that p P σ ∈ τ , while σG = τG if and only if
there is p ∈ G so that p P σ = τ . We can use this property as the definition of the
forcing extension. That is, define the following relations on the class of P-names:
σ =G τ ⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ G p P σ = τ
σ ∈G τ ⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ G p P σ ∈ τ.
It is readily checked that the relation =G is an equivalence relation and indeed a
congruence relation with respect to the relation ∈G. The forcing extension M [G]
can then be presented as the equivalence classes of names [σ]G by the relation
=G with the membership relation induced by ∈G. This is essentially the Boolean
ultrapower manner of constructing the forcing extension, rather than the value
recursion method (see [HS06] for an account of how these constructions can differ).
Let us see that the above described process is indeed effective in the ∆0-diagram.
Theorem 10. There is a uniform computable procedure that, given an oracle for
the ∆0-elementary diagram of a model of set theory 〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZF and a notion of
forcing P ∈M , computes an M -generic filter G ⊆ P and then computes the atomic
diagram of a presentation of the extension M [G]. Indeed, with this oracle it can
decide the ∆0-elementary diagram of this presentation.
Proof. The diagram of the forcing extension M [G] will be in the full forcing lan-
guage
〈M [G],∈M [G], Mˇ , σ〉σ∈MP ,
with a predicate Mˇ for the ground model and constants for all the P-names σ; we
denote the class of P-names in M by MP. The class MP of P-names was seen in
Lemma 9 to be computable from ∆0(M). The atomic forcing relations
p P σ = τ
p P σ ∈ τ,
have complexity ∆1 in the Le´vy hierarchy, with P as a parameter, because again
these relations are the result of the solution of a recursion of a ∆0 property (see
[GHH+] for explicit discussion of the forcing-relation-as-solution-to-a-recursion per-
spective). Similarly the negated atomic forcing relations are also ∆1 with P as a
parameter. So given the ∆0-diagram and the generic G we can compute =G, and
thereby pick out representatives from the equivalence classes and compute a bijec-
tion onto ω = domM [G] from the collection of these classes: 0 will denote the class
of the <-least P-name, 1 the class of the least P-name not in the class of 0, and so
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on. Similarly, we can also compute ∈G, giving us the atomic diagram of M [G] (in
the signature with just ∈).
We delay the argument that we can decide the ∆0-diagram of M [G] until after
a discussion of truth in the forcing extension; see the proof of Theorem 11. 
At last we come to truth in the forcing extension. As a first-order structure,
truth in M [G] is given by the usual Tarskian recursive construction. A key fact in
forcing, however, is that truth in the forcing extension is closely tied to the ground
model. We have already seen the start of this with the atomic forcing relations
p  σ ∈ τ and p  σ = τ . In general, for any formula ϕ(x0, . . . , xn) there is a
definable relation p  ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn) so that M [G] |= ϕ((σ0)G, . . . , (σn)G) if and
only if there is p ∈ G so that p  ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn). The map which sends ϕ to the
formula p  ϕ is effective. And as we explain in the proof, this map does not
increase complexity; if ϕ is ∆0 then p  ϕ is ∆1 and if ϕ is Σn (respectively Πn)
for n ≥ 1 then p  ϕ is Σn (respectively Πn).
Using these forcing relations, we can compute the elementary diagram of the
extension if we are given the elementary diagram of the ground model. Indeed, this
goes level by level.
Theorem 11. There is a uniform computable procedure that, given an oracle for
the full elementary diagram of a model of set theory 〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZF and a notion
of forcing P ∈M , decides the full elementary diagram of the presentation of M [G]
built in Theorem 10. Moreover, this goes level-by-level: given P and an oracle
for the Σn-elementary diagram of M , for n ≥ 1, it can decide the Σn-elementary
diagram of this presentation.
Proof. By the process of Theorem 10 we can compute a generic G and the atomic
diagram of M [G]. Consider next the forcing relations p P ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn), where
p ∈ P and ϕ is an assertion in the language of set theory with P-name parameters
σi ∈MP. For each formula ϕ, the corresponding forcing relation (as a relation on p
and the names σi) is definable in the ground modelM . Furthermore, the proof that
the forcing relations are definable is uniform, in the sense that from any formula
ϕ, we can write down the formula defining the corresponding forcing relation.5 So
it suffices to prove now that from the Σn-diagram of the ground model we can
compute the Σn-diagram of the extension. Given the full diagram of the ground
model, the same process will compute the full diagram of the extension.
First, we claim that the forcing relation p  ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn) for any ∆0-formula ϕ is
complexity ∆1 in the Le´vy hierarchy. This can be proved by induction on formulae.
The only nontrivial case is the bounded-quantifier case p  ∃x ∈ τ ϕ(x, σ), which
by the forcing recursion is equivalent to saying that there is a dense collection of
conditions q ≤ p with some 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ such that q ≤ r and q  ϕ(ρ, σ). The
point is that all these quantifiers remain bounded, and ∆1 is closed under bounded
quantification in set theory. This establishes that given the ∆0-diagram of M we
can compute the ∆0-diagram of M [G], completing the proof of Theorem 10.
We can now prove inductively that the forcing relation p  ϕ(σ) for Σn-formulae
ϕ has complexity Σn, for n ≥ 1, and similarly the forcing relation on Πn-formulae
5We are not claiming that the forcing relations are uniformly definable in M , since indeed as
ϕ increases in complexity, the complexity of the definition of p  ϕ(σ) similarly rises. Rather, we
only claim here that there is a computational procedure that maps any formula ϕ to the formula
forceϕ(p, σ) defining the forcing relation “p  ϕ(σ)” in M .
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is Πn.
6 We can tell if M [G] |= ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn), for ϕ a Σn-formula, by looking for a
condition p ∈ G such that M satisfies the assertion p P ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn).
7 Thus, the
Σn-diagram of the forcing extension M [G] can be computed from the Σn-diagram
of M , for n ≥ 1, as desired. 
We can also prove a version of this theorem for computable infinitary formulae.
By definition the Σc0-formulae are the Boolean combinations of atomic formulae—
which, since we work in the Le´vy signature, means precisely the ∆0-formulae—and
these are also the Πc0-formulae. For computable ordinals α, the Σ
c
α+1-formulae
are those Σα+1 Lω1,ω-formulae, with finitely many free variables ~x, that are com-
putable (countable) disjunctions of formulae ∃~ymγm(~x, ~ym), with each γm in Πcα.
(The length km of the tuple ~ym = (ym,1, . . . , ym,km) of variables may vary over
m, but must be computable from m.) The Πcα+1-formulae are their negations. For
computable limit ordinals α, the Σcα-formulae are computable disjunctions in which
each individual disjunct is Πcβ for some β < α; any computable presentation of α
may be used in this definition to give the β’s.
Theorem 12. Fix a computable ordinal α. Then there is a single computable
function f : ω2 → ω such that, for every model of set theory 〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZF and
every notion of forcing p = P ∈M , the function f(p, · ) : ω → ω is an m-reduction
from the Σcα-diagram of the structure M [G] produced by the procedure in Theorem
10 to the Σcα-diagram of M itself. (Here p ∈ ω = domM is the domain element
P.)
Proof. Knowing that the characteristic function of ∆0(M [G]) is given as Ψ
∆0(M)
for some Turing functional Ψ, we explain the m-reduction between the Σc1-diagrams
claimed in the theorem. A Σc1-formula
∨
m∈ω
∃~ym γm([σ1]G, . . . , [σk]G, ~ym),
using a computable sequence 〈γm〉m∈ω of ∆0-formulae about a finite tuple from
M [G], holds in M [G] just if there exist m, s ∈ ω, elements [τ1]G, . . . , [τkm ]G in
M [G], and a finite initial segment ρ ⊆ ∆0(M) such that Ψρ converges within s
steps on the Go¨del number of the formula γm([σ1]G, . . . , [σk]G, [τ1]G, . . . , [τkm ]G)
and outputs 1, meaning that this ∆0-formula holds in M [G]. This constitutes a Σ
c
1
statement aboutM itself, quantifying over the ρ ⊆ ∆0(M) which cause the program
Ψ to halt with value 1 (as well as overm, s, and the P-names). Since we can compute
an index for this Σc1 statement about M from the original formula about M [G], we
have an m-reduction from Σc1(M [G]) to Σ
c
1(M), as claimed. This same function is
an m-reduction from Πc1(M [G]) to Π
c
1(M), and analogous arguments hold with any
larger computable ordinal α+ 1 in place of 1, and also for limit ordinals. 
6Note that this argument uses the Replacement axiom schema. This is as p  ∃xϕ(x) if and
only if there are densely many q ≤ p so that q  ϕ(τ) for some name τ . It is the Replacement
schema that allows us to pull the bounded quantifier over q inside the unbounded quantifiers in
the definition for q  ϕ(τ) to obtain a Σn-formula.
7Recall that in this context we are working in the full forcing language with constants for
every P-name, so it is sensible to ask whether M [G] satisfies ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn) where the σi here are
constant symbols referring to (σi)G.
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5. The generic multiverse
In the previous section we investigated the computable structure theory of how a
modelM of set theory relates to a single forcing extensionM [G]. We turn now to a
broader perspective. Given a model 〈M,∈M 〉 of set theory, the generic multiverse of
M is the smallest collection of models of set theory which is closed under extension
by forcing and by grounds, whereW is a ground ofM if M is a forcing extension of
W via a partial order in W . In this section we would like to investigate the extent
to which the generic multiverse can be computed from countable M , extending the
analysis in Section 4. Let us begin by looking at grounds.
Lemma 13. There is a uniform computable procedure which given an oracle for
the Π2-elementary diagram of a model of set theory 〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZFC will compute
a list of the ∆0-diagrams of the grounds of M .
Proof. Because the membership relation of a ground of M is the restriction of the
membership relation of M and thus M and its grounds agree on ∆0 truth, all we
need to compute is the domains of the grounds. The key fact is the ground model
enumeration theorem [FHR15, Theorem 12], which asserts that the grounds of a
model of ZFC are uniformly definable by a Π2-formula. (See also [BHTU16, Sec-
tion 2].) That is, there is a Π2-formula ϕ(x, r) so that for each r either {x : ϕ(x, r)}
is empty or else it is a ground [FHR15]. So given the Π2-elementary diagram of M
we can compute whether {x : M |= ϕ(x, r)} is nonempty, say by checking whether
ϕ(∅, r) holds. We can thus compute the set {(n, x) :M |= ϕ(x, rn)} where rn is the
nth element r of M , according to the order on ω, so that {x : ϕ(x, r)} is nonempty.
From this we can get a list of the ∆0-diagrams of the grounds of M . 
Let us highlight the assumption in the statement of this theorem thatM satisfies
the axiom of choice, an assumption that was missing in the results in Section 4.
In [GJ14], Gitman and Johnstone showed for an ordinal δ that DCδ, a version of
the principle of dependent choice which is weaker than the full axiom of choice,
suffices to establish that ground models are definable for a certain class of forcings,
namely those with a gap at δ. (See their paper for definitions and details.) They
conjectured that the ground model definability theorem fails for ZF. This remains
an open problem, but Usuba has recently achieved some partial results [Usu19].
We assumed M satisfies the axiom of choice because in this case we do know that
the grounds are uniformly definable. If Gitman and Johnstone’s conjecture were to
be refuted, then we could improve this theorem to assume the model satisfies only
ZF instead of ZFC.
Corollary 14. Given an oracle for the full elementary diagram of a model of set
theory 〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZFC, there is a computable procedure to compute a list of the
full elementary diagrams of the grounds of M .
Proof. This follows using the fact that the translation map on formulae ϕ 7→ ϕW
is computable, if W is a definable class, since the translation is merely replacing
unbounded quantifiers with quantifiers bounded byW . So from the full elementary
diagram of M we can compute a listing of the elementary diagrams of the grounds
W of M . 
We turn now from the grounds to the full generic multiverse. It is not possible to
compute a listing of all the models in the generic multiverse for the simple reason
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that the generic multiverse is uncountable. Even if we restrict to extensions from
just a single simple forcing, for instance the forcing to add a Cohen real, there
will still be uncountably many extensions. Nevertheless, the computable generic
multiverse of M , that portion of the multiverse computable from the diagram of
M , is close to the full multiverse in a sense we now describe.
Usuba’s result that the grounds are strongly downward directed [Usu17] implies
that every model in the generic multiverse of M is at most two steps away from
M , namely it is a forcing extension of a ground of M . While we cannot in general
hope that every model is computable from the elementary diagram of M , we can
always compute a model which is a forcing extension of the same ground by the
same poset.
Corollary 15. Let 〈N¯ ,∈N¯ 〉 be a model in the generic multiverse of M , where
N¯ = W [G¯] for a distinguished ground W of M where G¯ is generic over W for a
distinguished poset P. Given an oracle for the full elementary diagram of M there
is a computable procedure to compute a W -generic filter G ⊆ P and decide the full
elementary diagram of N =W [G].
Proof. This follows immediately from Corollary 14 and Theorem 11. 
On the other hand, there is a different sense in which the computable generic
multiverse of M is far from the full generic multiverse of M . Namely, the com-
putable generic multiverse is not dense in the generic multiverse. There are models
in the generic multiverse so that no extension of them can be computed from the
full diagram for M .
Theorem 16. Let 〈M,∈M 〉 be a countable model of ZF. Then there is M [G] a
forcing extension of M by the forcing to add a Cohen-generic G ⊆ ωM so that
no outer model of of M [G] has a ∆0-diagram computable from the full elementary
diagram of M .
Proof. Let us first describe the generic G. Fix any real z, thought of as an ω-length
binary sequence, which is not computable from the full elementary diagram of M .
From the diagram of M we can compute a list of the dense subsets of Add(ω, 1)M .
We use this list to build a generic, in the following manner. Start with p0 = 〈z(0)〉.
Having built pn, first extend to meet the nth dense set, minimizing the length of
the extension (if there is more than one minimal length extension to the nth dense
set then pick arbitrarily). Then put z(n+ 1) on the end to get pn+1. Because we
met every dense set, G =
⋃
n pn is generic.
8
Assume now that 〈N,∈N 〉 is an outer model of M [G], where we think of the
universe of N as being N with ∈N being some binary relation on N. Let us see how
to compute z from the ∆0-diagram of N and the full diagram for M . Without loss
of generality we may assume that the ordinals ≤ ω in M and N are represented
by the same natural numbers, as we may compute an isomorphic copy of N with
this property from what we are given. Fix the index of G in N . From the ∆0-
diagram of N we can compute z(0), simply by asking what the first bit of G is.
From the full diagram of M we know the shortest distance we have to extend past
8Note that this process works even if M is ω-nonstandard. In this case, we still have a list,
whose ordertype is the real ω, of the dense subsets of Add(ω, 1)M . And since for each a ∈ ωM it
is dense in Add(ω, 1)M to have a condition with length ≥ a, the G we produce is unbounded in
ωM .
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p0 = 〈z(0)〉 to meet the 0th dense set. So we can compute the next coding point
and thereby recover z(1) and p1. Continuing this process upward, we can compute
z(n) for each n. Therefore, if we could compute the ∆0-diagram of N from the full
diagram of M then we could compute z from the full diagram of M , which would
be a contradiction. 
Next we wish to discuss the extent to which the computable generic multiverse
has the same structural properties as the full generic multiverse. Let us start with
the following property, due essentially to Mostowski [Mos76] and recently extended
in [HHK+19]. Given a collection E of models in the generic multiverse, say that
E is amalgamable when there is a model in the generic multiverse which contains
every model in U . Note that if each model in E is a forcing extension of M it is
equivalent to ask whether there is a forcing extension of M which contains every
model in E .
Theorem 17 (Mostowski). Let I be a finite set and let A be a family of subsets of
I which contains all singletons and is closed under subsets. Let 〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZF be a
countable model of set theory. Then there are reals ci ⊆ ωM for i ∈ I so that each ci
is Cohen-generic over M and for A ⊆ I the family {M [ci] : i ∈ A} is amalgamable
if and only if A ∈ A.
The same phenomenon happens within the computable generic multiverse.
Theorem 18. Let I be a finite set and let A be a family of subsets of I which con-
tains all singletons and is closed under subsets. Let 〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZF be a countable
model of set theory. Then from an oracle for the elementary diagram of M there
is a procedure to compute Cohen reals ci ⊆ ωM generic over M and the elemen-
tary diagrams of M [ci] for i ∈ I so that for A ⊆ I the family {M [ci] : i ∈ A} is
amalgamable in the generic multiverse if and only if A ∈ A.
Proof. In the language of [HHK+19], let z be a catastrophic real for M ; that is, z
is a real so that no outer model of M can contain z. We claim that there is such
z computable from the elementary diagram of M . Namely, we can take z to be an
isomorphic copy of ∈M on ω, along with with an isomorphism onto M . Then, by
the Mostowski collapse lemma, any model of ZF which contains z would have to
contain ∈M itself as a set, which is impossible for an outer model of M .
Without loss we may assume that I,A ∈ M . For each A ⊆ I let PA be the
forcing
∏
i∈AAdd(ω, 1) ∈M . From the elementary diagram of M we can compute
a listing, in ordertype ω, of all pairs 〈A,D〉 with A ∈ A and D ∈M a dense subsets
of PA. We build the Cohen reals ci by means of a descending sequence of conditions,
which we think of as filling in an ωM×I matrix with 0s and 1s, with the ith column
growing into ci. We will ensure that at each step of the construction we have built
all columns up to the same height.
We start with a completely empty matrix, i.e. with c0i = ∅ for all i ∈ I. Now
suppose we have built up cni . We are presented with An ∈ A and Dn ⊆ PA dense.
Extend the columns with index in An to collectively meet Dn, then pad with 1s to
ensure the columns all have the same height. Next, pad the remaining columns with
0s to build them up to the same height, then extend each column by appending a
row of 1s followed by a row of z(n)’s. Note that this process is computable given
the ∆0-diagram of M , since from that we can compute the minimal length we need
to extend to meet Dn and then pick one of the finitely many extensions of that
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length. So if we set ci to be the generic determined by 〈cni : n ∈ ω〉 then ci is
computable from the diagram of M . And so, once we know the ci’s are generic we
know that we can, as before, compute the full diagrams of the M [ci]’s.
It remains only to see that theM [ci]’s have the desired amalgamability property.
First, suppose that A ∈ A. Then we built up {ci : i ∈ A} so that they met every
dense subset of PA in M . So the ci for i ∈ A are mutually generic and so the family
{M [ci] : i ∈ A} is amalgamable, witnessed by M [ci : i ∈ A]. In particular, this
shows that each ci is generic over M . Now suppose that A ∈ P(I) \ A. Then, by
the construction, the only rows in which each ci for i ∈ A has value 1 are the rows
immediately before or at where the bits of z are coded. So no outer model of M
which satisfies ZFC can contain each ci for i ∈ A. 
In [HHK+19], the first and third author along with Habicˇ, Klausner, and Verner
extended Mostowski’s theorem. We will not reproduce that article here, but we
wish to note that the constructions therein are all effective. Given an oracle for the
elementary diagram of M there are computable procedures to compute the desired
generics for the results from that article. So the properties of the generic multiverse
explored in that article are also enjoyed by the computable generic multiverse.
To close out this section, we remark that the existence of many (non-isomorphic)
grounds for the same countable model of ZFC implies that in general it is impossible
to recoverM effectively—or even non-effectively—from an arbitrary copy of M [G].
M has a canonical embedding into M [G] by the map sending each x ∈ M to the
class [xˇ]G, where the P-name xˇ is defined by recursion as { 〈yˇ, 1〉 : y ∈ x }. With a
∆0(M)-oracle, one can compute xˇ from x, by the methods seen earlier for recursive
definitions, and thereby compute the canonical embedding of M into M [G]. Its
image will thus be ∆0(M)-computably enumerable in M [G], but it is not defined
uniformly across copies of M [G].
The question of how to recover a copy ofM from a copy ofM [G] is closely tied to
the question of whether ∆0(M [G]) can compute ∆0(M), and if so, whether there
is a uniform procedure for doing so from all copies of M [G]. The answer is not
obvious. Indeed, one can imagine the possibility that the isomorphism type of the
structure M [G] may be simpler in some sense than that of M , and that therefore
there may exist a copy of M [G] that cannot compute any copy of M . For example,
perhapsM [G] satisfies GCH, whereas the map κ 7→ 2κ on cardinals inM may have
been far more chaotic and may have encoded some information not intrinsically
recoverable from M [G].
There is an analogy here to computable fields. Rabin’s Theorem states that for
every computable field F , the algebraic closure F also has a computable presen-
tation, and that both a copy of F and an embedding of F into that copy may be
computed uniformly from the atomic diagram of F , in the signature with + and ·.
This much is analogous to our results above for a given (M,P). However, the uni-
formity carries over to countable fields F that are not computably presentable, and
in this case the algebraic closure may be far simpler than any presentation of F , as
every countable algebraically closed field has a computable presentation. Taking
the algebraic closure smooths out a field and eliminates complexity, and we ask
whether the same might happen with a forcing extension of a model of set theory.
Question 19. Let M be a countable model of ZFC, and P ∈ M a forcing notion,
for which the procedure in Theorem 10 computes a filter G and the atomic diagram
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of a presentation of M [G]. Can there exist a presentation A ∼= M [G] such that
for every presentation M∗ ∼= M , we have ∆0(M∗) 6≤T ∆0(A)? And if so, can this
presentation A be the one computed by our procedure?
6. Class forcing
Elsewhere, we have restricted our attention to forcing notions which are set-sized.
We detour in this section to consider proper class-sized forcing notions. There are
two major approaches to formulate class forcing, and we consider both of them. The
first approach, let us call it the first-order approach, is to work over ZF (possibly
assuming more) and deal with a definable class. A generic then has to meet every
definable dense subclass of the forcing notion.
Theorem 20. Given an oracle for the full elementary diagram of a countable
model 〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZF and given a definable pretame class forcing P ⊆ M , there is
a computable procedure to compute an M -generic filter G ⊆ P and decide the full
elementary diagram of the forcing extension M [G].
See [Fri00, Section 2.2] for a definition of pretameness, which is equivalent to
the preservation of ZF− (in the language with a predicate for the generic filter).
The reason to ask P to be pretame is that the pretame forcings are precisely those
which have a definable atomic forcing relation [HKS18].
Proof. From the full diagram of M we can compute a list of the definable dense
subclasses of P. So we can compute G as in Theorem 8. Now given the atomic
forcing relation for P there is a computable procedure to associate a formula ϕ with
the formula defining the corresponding forcing relation p  ϕ. So we can compute
M [G] and its full elementary diagram as in Theorem 11. 
This answers the question for the first-order approach. We turn now to the
other approach, call it the second-order approach. For this approach classes are
actual objects in our models, where we work (in first-order logic) with two-sorted
structures. We work over a second-order set theory, such as Go¨del–Bernays set
theory GB or Kelley–Morse set theory KM.9 We will use italic letters such M to
refer to the sets and calligraphic letters such asM to refer to the classes of a model
of second-order set theory. Abusing notation slightly, we will also useM to refer to
the whole model; this is unambiguous, as the sets are definable from the classes. A
class forcing notion P is then a class in the model and a generic meets every dense
subclass of P in the model. We will write M[G] for the extension by a generic
G ⊆ P.10
9GB is the weaker of the two, stating the existence of classes defined predicatively—
quantification is allowed only over sets. On the other hand, KM allows for impredicative com-
prehension, defining classes by quantifying over the classes. See [Wil19, Section 2] for precise
axiomatizations of these two theories, as well as a discussion for their place in the hierarchies of
second-order set theories.
10Our approach is in first-order logic with two-sorted structures, but as is well-known one can
equivalently work in second-order logic with Henkin semantics. In this semantics, one explicitly
lists out the classes considered for the second-order part of semantics. Note, however, that to make
this approach amenable to the context of computable structure theory we would have to attach
to each model a list of the classes to be used for its second-order semantics. That is, we would
need natural numbers to identify each class and have a relation about the set-class membership
relation. This amounts to the same as the approach in first-order logic.
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Let ∆10 refer to the class of formulae with only set quantifiers. Up to equivalence,
this is the same as the class of formulae where all quantifiers are bounded, possibly
by classes, because ∃x ϕ(x) is equivalent to ∃x ∈ V ϕ(x). So this is the second-order
analogue of ∆0 in the first-order Le´vy hierarchy.
Theorem 21. Let 〈M,∈M〉 be a countable model of GB and suppose P ∈ M is
a class forcing notion with its atomic forcing relation a class in M. Then, from
an oracle for the ∆10-elementary diagram of M there is a computable procedure to
compute an M-generic filter G ⊆ P and the ∆10-diagram of M[G].
Proof. Begin by observing that it is ∆10 to say that a class is a dense subclass of P.
So from the ∆10-diagram forM we can compute a list of all the dense subclasses of
P. We can then compute an M-generic filter G ⊆ P as in Theorem 8. Next, note
that being a class P-name is a ∆10 property, because a class P-name is a class whose
elements are all pairs of elements of P and a set P-name, and being a set P-name
is a ∆10 property. So we can decide which elements of M are P-names. Further
observe that the relations
p  σ ∈ τ, p  σ = τ, p  σ ∈ T, p  Σ = T
are all ∆10. As in the proof of Theorem 11 given the genericG we can define relations
=G and ∈G on the P-names, which are decidable from the ∆10-diagram. And so
we can pick out representatives of the =G-equivalence classes, thereby computing
the atomic diagram of M[G]. Finally, observe that for a ∆10-formula ϕ that p 
ϕ(Σ0, . . . ,Σn) is ∆
1
0, as it is defined from the atomic forcing relation by quantifying
over sets. So we can decide the ∆10-diagram of M[G]. 
As in the set forcing case, from the full elementary diagram ofM we can compute
the full elementary diagram of the class forcing extension.
Theorem 22. Let 〈M,∈M〉 be a countable model of GB and suppose P ∈ M is a
class forcing notion with its atomic forcing relation in M. Then, from an oracle
for the second-order elementary diagram of M there is a computable procedure to
compute an M-generic filter G ⊆ P and the second-order elementary diagram of
M[G].
To clarify, by the second-order elementary diagram of a model of second-order set
theory we mean second-order in the sense of allowing quantifying over the classes
of the model—that is, in the Henkin semantics—not second-order in some external
sense.
Proof. By Theorem 21 we can compute G and the ∆10-diagram ofM[G]. The result
for the full diagram then follows from the fact that p  ϕ(T0, . . . , Tn) is second-order
definable when ϕ is second-order. 
It is natural to ask whether this goes level-by-level. The Σ1n and Π
1
n-formulae
are inductively defined from the ∆10-formula similar to how in first-order set theory
the Σn and Πn-formulae are defined from the ∆0-formulae. For instance, a formula
is Σ12 if it is of the form ∃X∀Y ϕ(X,Y ), where both quantifiers are over the classes
and ϕ is ∆10. To argue this goes level-by-level as in the set forcing case we would
need that if ϕ is Σ1n then p  ϕ is Σ
1
n. To prove the analogous fact for the set
forcing case we used the Replacement schema.11 The same argument works in the
11Cf. Footnote 6.
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class forcing case if our model satisfies the Class Collection schema, a second-order
version of the Replacement schema.
Definition 23. The Class Collection axiom schema asserts that if for every set
there is a class satisfying some property, then there is a single class coding the
“meta-class” consisting of a witnessing class for every set. Formally, instances of
this schema take the form
∀P¯
[
(∀x∃Y ϕ(x, Y, P¯ ))⇒ (∃C∀x ∃i ϕ(x, (C)i, P¯ ))
]
,
where (C)i = {y : (i, y) ∈ C}.
12 For n ∈ ω, the Σ1n-Class Collection schema is the
restriction of Class Collection to Σ1n-formulae.
It is simple to check that Σ1n-Class Collection implies Σ
1
n-Comprehension. The
converse does not hold. Even KM with the full impredicative Comprehension
schema cannot prove Σ10-Class Collection [GHK]. However, adding Class Collection
does not increase consistency strength—see [MM75, Theorem 2.5] for the KM/full
Class Collection case and [Rat79] for the level-by-level case.
Corollary 24. Let 〈M,∈M〉 be a countable model of GB + Σ1n-Class Collection
and suppose P ∈M is a class forcing notion with its atomic forcing relation in M.
Then, from an oracle for the Σ1n-elementary diagram of M there is a computable
procedure to produce an M-generic filter G ⊆ P and the Σ1n-elementary diagram of
M[G]. 
7. Functoriality and Interpretability
In this article we are considering an effective procedure mapping one class of
models on the domain ω to another such class (in fact, to the same class). In this
section we recall some known theorems about this scenario and what it says about
effective interpretability, relating these general facts to our specific case of a model
M of set theory inside a forcing extension M [G].
Theorems from [HTMMM17] and [HTMM18] relate such procedures to the in-
terpretability of each output model (in the second class) to the corresponding input
model (in the first class). Here we repeat the simplest versions of those theorems.
The gist is that interpretations of one structure in another by Lω1,ω-formulae (and
with no fixed arity on the domain of the interpretation) correspond bijectively to
functors from the category of isomorphic copies of the second structure (with iso-
morphisms as the morphisms in the category) into the category of isomorphic copies
of the first.
Theorem 25 (Theorem 1.5 of [HTMMM17]). Let A and B be countable structures.
Then A is effectively interpretable in B if and only if there exists a computable
functor from the category Iso(B) of isomorphic copies of B (under isomorphism)
to the corresponding category Iso(A).
Theorem 26 (Theorem 2.9 of [HTMM18]). Let B and A be countable structures,
possibly in different countable languages. For each Baire-measurable functor F :
Iso(B) → Iso(A) there is an infinitary interpretation I of A within B, such that
F is naturally isomorphic to the functor FI associated to I. Furthermore, if F
is ∆0α in the lightface Borel hierarchy, then the interpretation can be taken to use
12Observe that in the presence of Global Choice—the assertion that every class can be well-
ordered—we may equivalently ask that this index i for x be x itself.
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computable ∆0α Lω1,ω-formulae and the isomorphism between F and FI can be taken
to be ∆0α.
We refer the reader to the sources of these theorems rather than attempt to
define all the terms here. Those sources also extend these theorems to situations of
bi-interpretability between countable structures, and (of greater relevance here) to
interpretations that hold uniformly from one class of structures to another, rather
than interpretations merely of A in B. For us, the point is simply that results
about functors and their complexity, such as the simple ones we derive in this
section, correspond to results about interpretability. For example, a computable
functor mapping copies of M to copies of M [G] would correspond to an effective
interpretation of M [G] in M .
A computable functor is a particularly strong kind of operator on countable
structures. Characteristically, attempting to create such an operator requires one
to determine exactly which aspects of the structure are relevant to the operation.
The following analysis is not difficult, but it serves as a good example of this
principle.
We here extend the Le´vy signature defined above to a larger signature. Along
with the symbols from the former, this new signature has countably many constants
p, c, and d0, d1, . . .. The intention (which can be expressed as an Lω1,ω-formula,
but not by any finitary axiom) is that p denotes the partial order P used for forcing
in this structure, that the constants dj name precisely the dense subsets of P, and
that c names a choice function on the nonempty subsets of P in M . We consider
models of ZFC here, not just ZF, to ensure that M will contain such a choice
function, although in many cases P will have a readily definable choice function. It is
important that c be internal toM , and so formally we treat c as a constant symbol,
rather than a function symbol. The domain of our functor is the category of models
of ZFC on the domain ω, in our larger signature, satisfying these conditions. The
morphisms between two such structures are exactly the isomorphisms of structures
in this signature. The range of the functor is the category of models of ZFC on
the domain ω in the Le´vy signature, since in the forcing extension, the forcing
notion is no longer relevant. (If desired, one can use the larger signature, with the
check-name of pM as pM [G] and similarly for c and the dj .)
The construction of the generic G is now done effectively by a prescribed method,
which is more precise than the method of Theorem 10. The added precision is
necessary to allow the functor to be computed with no more constants than these.
In the new method, the functional Φ is given as an oracle the atomic diagram of M
in the larger signature, namely ∆0(M) ⊕ 〈pM , cM , dM0 , d
M
1 , . . .〉, and searches first
for the maximum element p0 of the forcing notion P named by the constant p. The
∆0-diagram identifies it, as it is defined by p0 ∈ P∧ (∀q ∈ P)q ≤P p0. Next, for each
s in turn, we find the element dMs and use c to select an extension ps+1 ≤ ps in
ds ∩ P. We can do so because the set x = {q ∈
M ds : q ≤ ps} ∈ M is ∆0-definable
from parameters we have access to. So we can search for the element of M which
satisfies this defining property and know that the search must terminate. Then we
can search for c(x) ∈ M and choose it to be ps+1. While we use the < relation
on the domain ω of M to search for x and then c(x), note that this procedure is
nevertheless uniform as the search is looking for a uniquely determined object.
If f : M → M∗ is an isomorphism (in the larger signature), then the same
procedure Φ on ∆0(M
∗, pM
∗
, ~dM
∗
, cM
∗
) will clearly produce a forcing extension
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M∗[G∗] isomorphic to M [G]. The point of this method is that there is a Turing
functional Φ∗ which from the oracle
∆0(M,p
M , ~dM , cM )⊕ f ⊕∆0(M
∗, pM
∗
, ~dM
∗
, cM
∗
)
computes the corresponding isomorphism from M [G] onto M∗[G∗]. This map on
isomorphisms will respect composition and, if given the identity isomorphism onM ,
will produce the identity isomorphism on M [G]. We do not consider it necessary
to write out the proof of this result. This Φ∗, together with the functional Φ
that computes ∆0(M [G]) = Φ
∆0(M), constitutes a program for the forcing functor,
showing that F is in fact a computable functor, according to the definition in
[MPSS18].
We remark additionally that the forcing functor works exactly the same way
in the category with the same objects as above, but in which the morphisms now
include all injective homomorphisms from any one forcing structure to any other.
Of course, the image of a morphism g now need only be an injective homomorphism
itself, not an isomorphism, but functoriality still holds, effectively.
None of the foregoing is at all difficult. With the new constant symbols enu-
merating the dense sets we get functoriality but, as will be established in the next
section, if we omit them we do not get functoriality. Meanwhile, though, we can
apply Theorem 25 to our computable functor and extract from it an effective in-
terpretation, uniformly across all forcing extensions built by the functor.
Corollary 27. There exist fixed computable infinitary Σ1-formulae that, for every
ground model (M,∆0(M), p, c, d0, d1, . . .) of ZFC in the larger signature, give an ef-
fective interpretation of the forcing extension M [G] in (M,∆0(M), p, c, d0, d1, . . .),
provided G is built from this presentation as described in this section. (The inter-
pretation allows tuples from M of arbitrary finite arity in its domain.)
8. Non-functoriality
In the main theorem, we proved that there is a computable procedure
(M,∈M ,P) 7→ G
that takes as input the atomic diagram of a model of set theory 〈M,∈M ,P〉 with
a distinguished notion of forcing P ∈ M , and produces an M -generic filter G ⊆ P.
We had observed, however, that the particular filter G arising from this process
can depend on how exactly the atomic diagram of M is presented to us. If we
rearrange the copy of M as it is represented on the natural numbers (to be used as
an oracle for the computation), then this can affect the order in which the dense
sets ds appear and therefore affect which conditions ps arise in the construction.
In short, the computational procedure we provided does not respect isomorphisms
of presentations, since different isomorphic presentations of the same model can
lead to non-isomorphic generic filters. Thus the process of computing the generic
filter is not functorial in the category of presentations of models of set theory under
isomorphism.
We claimed in Section 7 that in this signature this phenomenon is unavoidable.
To justify that claim, we now show that even if one allows the full elementary
diagram of the model M as input, there is no effective procedure that will pick out
the same generic filter in all presentations of the same model.
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Theorem 28. If ZF is consistent, then there is no computable procedure that takes
as input the elementary diagram of a model of set theory 〈M,∈M ,P〉 with a partial
order P and produces an M -generic filter G ⊆ P, such that isomorphic copies of
the input model result always in the same corresponding isomorphic copy of G.
In other words, there is no computable procedure to produce generic filters that is
functorial in the category of presentations of models of set theory under isomor-
phism.
Proof. Assume toward contradiction that we have a computable procedure
Φ : ∆(M,∈M ,P) 7→ G,
where we assume M = N and 〈M,∈M ,P〉 |= ZF and P ∈ M is a partial order in
M , such that G ⊆ P is M -generic and this process is functorial, in the sense that
isomorphic presentations of 〈M,∈M 〉 lead always to the same isomorphic copy of
G.
We assumed that ZF is consistent. It follows by the Le´vy–Montague reflection
principle and a simple compactness argument that there is a countable model M |=
ZF such that Mκ ≺M for some cardinal κ in M , where Mκ means the rank-initial
segment (Vκ)
M .13 Fix any nontrivial forcing notion P ∈Mκ, such as the forcing to
add a Cohen real.
The main idea of the proof is to try to run the computational process inside the
model M . This doesn’t make literal sense, of course, since in M we do not have
the elementary diagram of M as a countable set. Nevertheless, in M we do have
the elementary diagram of Mκ, which although uncountable, is a set in M and
therefore has its diagram in M . It may be that M is ω-nonstandard and therefore
may also have nonstandard-length formulae in its version of the diagram, which of
course cannot be part of the real elementary diagram. But on the standard-length
formulae, M will agree with us on the elementary diagram of Mκ.
Inside M , consider all the ways that we might place finitely much information
about the elementary diagram of Mκ. Specifically, we enumerate finitely many
elements ofMκ and then list off finitely many truth judgments about those elements,
and use this as a partial oracle in the computational process of Φ.
If outside M we were to consider a full presentation of the elementary diagram
of Mκ, then the process Φ will result in complete judgments about membership in
an Mκ-generic filter G ⊆ P, and furthermore these judgments will be independent
of the presentation of the diagram we consider. It follows that for any particular
condition p ∈ P, there is a finite piece of the (full, actual) presentation that leads
to a judgment by Φ either that p ∈ G or that p /∈ G.
The key observation is that this finite piece of the full actual diagram of Mκ
will be an element of M and therefore M will be able to see the judgment that Φ
makes on whether p ∈ G or not. Furthermore, all minimal-length such pieces of the
diagram of Mκ in M that decide whether p ∈ G or not will agree on the outcome,
since any such minimal-length piece will involve only standard-finite formulae and
therefore in principle can be continued outsideM to a presentation of the full actual
13In general, M may be ω-nonstandard. But note that the existence of well-founded M with
Mκ ≺ M is consistent relative an inaccessible cardinal (indeed, less is necessary). However, this
assumption is higher in consistency strength than just asking for a well-founded model of set
theory.
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diagram ofMκ, which always gives the same result about membership in G. Conse-
quently, by searching inside M for these minimal-length supporting computations
about Mκ, we conclude that G ∈M .
But this is impossible, since all subsets of P in M are in Mκ, since Mκ is a rank-
initial segment of M , and so G will actually be M -generic, while also an element
of M , which is impossible for nontrivial forcing. 
It follows that, given suitable consistency assumptions, there also can be no func-
torial computable procedure for producing just the atomic diagram of the forcing
extension M [G], since there are some forcing notions P, such as the self-encoding
forcing defined in [FHR15], that produce unique generic filters in their extensions;
for such forcing notions over a well-founded ground model, the extensions are iso-
morphic if and only if the generic filters are identical.
In the argument for the proof of Theorem 28 we produced a specific model
which witnessed the failure of a would-be Turing functor Φ. It is natural to wonder
whether given any Φ and given any countable modelM of set theory we can witness
the failure of Φ with an isomorphic copy of M .
The following theorem answers this question in the negative. If we restrict to the
pointwise definable models then we can produce generics in a functorial manner. A
model of set theory is pointwise definable if every element of the model is definable
without parameters. For example, the Shepherdson–Cohen minimum transitive
model of ZF is pointwise definable.
Theorem 29. There is a computable functor Φ, in which Φ takes as input the
elementary diagram of any pointwise definable model 〈M,∈M 〉 |= ZFC and a forcing
notion P ∈ M and returns an M -generic G ⊆ P and the elementary diagram of
M [G]. That is, if 〈M∗,∈M
∗
〉 and 〈M †,∈M
†
〉 are two isomorphic presentations of
M then Φ(M∗,∈M
∗
,P∗) ∼= Φ(M †,∈M
†
,P†).
Proof. The key step in getting functoriality is to ensure that isomorphic presenta-
tions give rise to corresponding isomorphic generic filters. That is, if π :M∗ →M †
is an isomorphism we want that π " G∗ = G†, where G∗ and G† are the generics
produced by Φ. Given this it is then straightforward that the isomorphism between
M∗ and M † extends to an isomorphism between M∗[G∗] and M †[G†].
Let us see how to produce the generic. There is a canonical computable listing
of the possible definitions in the language of set theory in ordertype ω. From
the elementary diagram of M we can decide which element is defined by which
definition. So using the fact that M is pointwise definable we can produce a listing
m0,m1, . . . of the elements of M , starting with the element defined by the zeroth
definition, then the element defined by the first definition, and so on. This listing
is canonical, in the sense that isomorphic copies of M will give rise to the same
listing. More formally: if π : M∗ →M † is an isomorphism then π(m∗i ) = m
†
i for all
i ∈ ω. We then use this listing to list out the dense subsets of P and to define the
generic, as in the argument for Theorem 8. Because isomorphic copies ofM will use
the same listing of their elements, this process will produce the same generic. 
We claim that the non-functoriality result extends beyond computability to the
case of Borel processes. Note that in the Borel context, from the atomic diagram
of a model we can recover its full elementary diagram by a Borel function, and so
the distinction between those cases evaporates.
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Theorem 30. Suppose ZF is consistent. Then there is no Borel function
(M,∈M ,P) 7→ G
mapping codes for countable 〈M,∈M ,P〉 |= ZF with a forcing notion P ∈ M
to an M -generic filter G ⊆ P, such that isomorphic models lead always to the
same (isomorphic) filter. Indeed, we cannot even get such a Borel function so
that if 〈M∗,∈M
∗
,P∗〉 and 〈M †,∈M
†
,P†〉 are elementarily equivalent then so are
〈M∗[G∗],∈M
∗[G∗]〉 and 〈M †[G†],∈M
†[G†]〉.
We first proved this result with a mild extra consistency assumption. Philipp
Schlicht privately communicated to us an argument which needs only the minimum
assumption that ZF is consistent. With his permission, it is his argument we present
here.
Proof (Schlicht). Suppose that there is a Borel function Φ(M,∈M ,P) = G, de-
fined from some real parameter y, such that if 〈M∗,∈M
∗
,P∗〉 and 〈M †,∈M
†
,P†〉
are codes for elementarily equivalent countable models of ZF (coded, say, as a bi-
nary relation ∈M on the natural numbers M = N) equipped with forcing notions
P∗ ∈ M∗ and P† ∈ M †, then if G∗ = Φ(M∗,∈M
∗
,P∗) and G† = Φ(M †,∈M
†
,P†)
then 〈M∗[G∗],∈M
∗[G∗]〉 and 〈M †[G†],∈M
†[G†]〉 are elementarily equivalent. In par-
ticular, if 〈M∗,∈M
∗
〉 and 〈M †,∈M
†
〉 are isomorphic, then Φ produces elementarily
equivalent forcing extensions.
The desired counterexample will be a pair of isomorphic presentations of a
Cohen-generic extension of a pointwise definable model of ZF + V = L. Observe
that the existence of such follows from the assumption that ZF is consistent: A
famous result due to Go¨del gives us a model of ZF + V = L and using that model’s
definable global well-order we get Skolem functions so that the Skolem hull of the
empty set is pointwise definable. Call this pointwise definable model 〈N,∈N 〉.
Work in N . Let Q ∈ N denote the Cohen forcing poset to add a single real
(in the sense of N) and let ρ ∈ N be a Q-name for the set of finite variants of
the generic real. Consider P˙ a Q-name so that 1Q forces that P˙ is the poset which
chooses an element of ρ by lottery and codes that real into the continuum pattern
below ℵω, via adding Cohen-generic subsets to the ℵn. Observe that if the generic
real is modified on a finite domain, then this forcing does not change.
In V , let H be the transitive collapse of a countable elementary submodel of
some large enough Hθ which contains y and a code for N . Observe that we can
think of Q as forcing poset in H . Of course, N may be ω-nonstandard and so Cohen
forcing in the sense of N need not be the real Cohen forcing. Nevertheless, H sees
that Q is a poset, as that is absolute even for nonstandard models of set theory.
Now let x be H-generic for Q. Then x must also be N -generic for Q. SetM = N [x]
and P = P˙x ∈M . Then 〈M,∈M ,P〉 will yield the desired counterexample.
Because M is countable in H [x], it has a real code. Let µ, ε, π ∈ H be Q-
names so that 〈M∗,∈M
∗
,P∗〉 = 〈µx, εx, πx〉 is an isomorphic copy of 〈M,∈M ,P〉
on the natural numbers. Moreover, fix a condition q ∈ x which forces this. Then
〈M∗,∈M
∗
,P∗〉 is appropriate as input to Φ. Because Φ is Borel as defined using
a real parameter y ∈ H , we have that H [x] can compute Φ(M∗,∈M
∗
,P∗). More-
over, in the forcing extension of 〈M∗,∈M
∗
,P∗〉 via the generic output by Φ, call it
M∗[G∗], we can check the continuum pattern below ℵω to determine which finite
variant of x was used in the lottery sum.
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Take p in this generic G∗ which forces that the finite variant chosen to code
into the continuum pattern is x △ a. Now define x′ so that x′(i) 6= x(i) for i =
max(a ∪ { |p|, |q| }) + 1 and x′ agrees with x on all other coordinates. Then x′
extends q and is H-generic for Q, and thus also N -generic. In particular, in N [x′]
we have that p forces the continuum pattern in the extension to be x′ △ a. And
since x′ and x differ on a single coordinate, M = N [x] = N [x′] and P = P˙x = P˙x
′
.
Thus, 〈M †,∈M
†
,P†〉 = 〈µx
′
, εx
′
, πx
′
〉 is isomorphic to 〈M∗,∈M
∗
,P∗〉. Note now
that p ∈ G† = Φ(M †,∈M
†
,P†) because H [x] = H [x′] and x′ was defined to agree
with x up to the amount of information needed about µ, ε, and π to have Φ put
p in the generic. But the models M∗[G∗] and M †[G†] have different continuum
patterns, disagreeing at ℵi.
The statements “GCH holds at ℵn” or “GCH fails at ℵn” show up in the theory
of a model for standard natural numbers n. But if M∗[G∗] and M †[G†] are ω-
nonstandard and i is nonstandard this may not be enough. This is where we use
the assumption that the models extend a pointwise definable model of V = L; it
follows that any nonstandard natural number in these models is definable. Thus,
the statements show up in their theory, even if n is nonstandard. Thus they cannot
be elementarily equivalent, giving us the desired counterexample. 
Meanwhile, if we go to the projective level, then there will (consistently) be a
functorial process. For example, if V = L, then in L given any countable oracle
code for a structure, we can find the L-least isomorphic copy in a projective way,
specifically at the level ∆12. If we now build M [G] using this copy, it will be
constant on the isomorphism class of M , which is a very strong way of respecting
isomorphism. Whether we can push this lower down in the projective hierarchy
remains open.
Question 31. Is there an analytic (or co-analytic) functorial method to produce
generics for models of set theory?
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